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ROBERT W. BoGoU*
The movement to enact legislation authorizing the creation of common trust
funds is of recent origin. That movement was given momentum in 1936 with the
passage of the Federal Revenue Act' which exempted common trust funds from
taxation as corporations. As a result, it is expected that in 1939 when most of the
state legislatures again convene many states will give legislative sanction to the estab-
lishment of common trust funds. At the present time eight states have enacted such
statutes.2 All but three of the statutes antedate the passage of the Federal Revenue
Act. Ohio, far ahead of the other states, passed its act in i919. Vermont and Penn-
sylvania enacted enabling legislation in 1933. Delaware and Oregon followed in the
next general assembly year, 1935. In 1937 Indiana, Minnesota, and New York passed
similar acts. Pennsylvania in that year enacted another statute which is devoted to
participating mortgages, but which is in terms broad enough to include common
trust funds.
The statutes which have been passed fall between extremes set by the statutes of
Ohio and New York. The Ohio act is brief and general, merely authorizing the
establishment of common trust funds. At the other extreme the New York statute
not only provides in considerable detail rules for the formation and control of com-
mon trust funds, but also directs their supplementation with regulations by the New
York State Banking Board. s The remaining statutes provide requirements and re-
strictions, but do not attempt to enact a complete scheme.
Other articles in this symposium deal with problems of policy and practice in the
regulation and operation of common trust funds. 4 Accordingly the purpose of this
article has been restricted to the comparative analysis of the terms of the eight
enabling acts. Because of its comprehensive character the New York act has been
used as a point of departure in the sections which follow. Subsequent references to
the state statutes will not be accompanied by citations except for the New York,
Indiana, and 1933 Pennsylvania acts which alone are divided into sections.
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L A STRucruE
Common trust funds have in the past taken the form of a pool, trust, or corpora-
tion.5 The pool plan contemplates an outright undivided legal ownership of assets
in the common fund by each participating trust. The trust type of common fund
requires the trust company to make a declaration of trust .of the common fund
assets under which the trust company holds legal title to the whole fund and the
equitable title of the interests as trustee of the participating estates, leaving the
beneficiaries an equitable interest in an equitable interest. The corporate form of
common fund employs the formation of a separate corporation to hold legal title to
the assets. The participating trusts hold shares of stock in the incorporated fund.
The New York act provides: "Ownership of the individual assets and investments
of the common trust fund shall be in the trust company as trustee of such fund."'
Such a provision seems to require the establishment of a legal structure of the trust
type. Concurring with New York is Vermont providing: "A trust company. may
create a trust investment account to be known as its associated investment account
to which may be intrusted for investment the whole or any part of the funds of trusts
permissible to be associated. An individual trust whose funds are thus associated
shall at all times be considered the equitable owner of its pro rata share." The
Pennsylvania statute, first enacted, is devoted to authorization of common trust
funds established by a trust company, and limits the fund to a trust form of legal
structure in this language: "Interests in such pool or fund. ... shall be held solely
by the bank and trust company, or the trust company, as fiduciary, and the equitable
interest owned solely by the estates of which such bank and trust company, or trust
company is fiduciary" '7 The more recent Pennsylvania statute is couched in these
terms: "... such fractional interests being apportioned among estates of which the
person or corporation creating such fractional undivided interests is the fiduciary."
The absence of the characterizing phrase "equitable interests" from this act would
seem to permit, if not to compel, the pool structure. The Oregon statute is of a
similar type: "A trust company ... may apportion any part interest therein to any
of its trusts." The statute of Minnesota provides: "[The trust company] may invest
in fractional parts of, as well as in whole, securities, or may commingle funds for
investments, all of the fractional parts of such securities, or the whole of the funds
so commingled shall be owned and held by such trust company in its several trust
capacities." Such language points to the pool rather than the trust type of legal
structure. The remaining states make no provision restricting the fund to any of the
three categories.
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TRusTs ELIGIBLE TO PARTICIPATE
New York expressly prohibits the investment of funds from a trust revocable by
the grantor, one not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of income
or principal, or by such person in conjunction with the grantor.8 This precaution,
adopted in no other state, apparently intended to prevent "runs" in periods of market
depression perpetrated by persons who were using the fund as a subterfuge for invest-
ment purposes, has proved in the past to have been unnecessary because the feared
"runs" failed to materialize.9
Only New York provides that except where the instrument forbids, permission to
invest in a common fund has retrospective application. The act extends the use of
common trust funds to those funds where there is a fiduciary relationship "arising
before or after the passing of this act."' 0 In those states which provide the common
fund as another legal investment, namely, Pennsylvania (second statute), Delaware,
Oregon, and Indiana, restrospective application may be expected by analogy to any
other change in the legal list which has such effect. Since one of the principal objec-
tions to relying on authorizations in the trust instruments to invest in common
fimds is the fact that this will not aid existing trusts, the importance of providing for
retrospective application is evident.
THE TRUsTEE
Alone among the acts under consideration, the second Pennsylvania statute allows
a personal trustee to set up a common fund. The prior Pennsylvania statute1 1 limits
this power to corporate trustees, as do the statutes of the other states. Because the
problems incident to the administration of numerous small trust funds arise pri-
marily among corporate trustees such a limitation is to be expected.
The New York 12 and Minnesota acts both allow a fund of which the trust com-
pany is co-trustee to be invested in a common trust fund. The Indiana statute would
apparently require the trust company to be sole trustee of the participating estates.
It provides: "nor shall any ownership of any part of said fund nor any interest
therein be acquired by any person other than the bank or trust company in its
fiduciary capacity."' s Delaware adopts somewhat similar language: "it shall not be
permitted that any such fractional interests shall at any time be owned by any other
than such bank or trust company acting in a fiduciary capacity." The language of
both the Indiana and Delaware statutes, while apparently not aimed at eliminating
the possibility of a co-trustee, would seem broad enough to accomplish that end.
The provision in the Federal Revenue Act that the common fund "be exclusively
for the collective investment of moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity
8 N. Y. BANKNG LAw Szoo-c(I).
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as trustee, executor, administrator or guardian,"'14 is somewhat ambiguous. The
purpose of the provision is to guarantee that the funds will not be used for non-
fiduciary purposes, and a construction which would expose the whole fund to
taxation because the trust company was co-trustee of one participating trust would
be a strained one.
No other statutes contain pertinent provisions either way, with the exception of
clauses vesting exclusive control to the trust company. Both New York 5 and
Delaware have such provisions. Because unity of control is vital to managerial effi-
ciency and responsibility, and because the Federal Reserve Board regulations16 require
such exclusive control, a construction of the other statutes to reach that end seems
desirable.
This vesting of exclusive control over common trust funds in the corporate trus-
tees creating them would result in an improper delegation of authority by depriving
individual co-trustees of their discretionary powers with respect to investments in
the common fund. Such a delegation would normally constitute a breach of trust.'7
Consequently in those states where no express provision is made for co-trustees the
statute may be construed so as to preclude participation of trust estates which are
held by more than one trustee. Where, however, the statute provides expressly, as in
New York and Minnesota, or by implication, as may prove to be the case in other
states, that estates in which there are co-trustees may participate in the fund, then it
would appear that the statute has to this extent changed the common law rule as to
delegation. Yet even though the co-trustee has not improperly delegated his powers
by authorizing investment in the fund, the question remains what liability he is
subject to for subsequent investment losses. An inactive trustee is usually held to a
duty of exercising a reasonable degree of diligence in supervision over the manage-
ment of the trust estate,' 8 and, if, in the exercise of such diligence, a co-trustee were
to learn of mismanagement in a common fund, he would be under a duty to act for
the protection of the estate. New York facilitates such action by granting the co-
trustee power to compel withdrawal upon presentation to the trust company of
written notice.'9 In the absence of such a provision a co-trustee, by producing before
the proper court evidence of improper management of the fund, could obtain a court
order directing such withdrawal.20 Legislative clarification of the problem seems
needed.
3" 49 STAT. 1708, 26 U. S. C. A. §569(a) (Supp. 1936).
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Tim FIDucIARY RELATIONSHIP
The common fund does not serve the real purpose for which it was intended
unless it is limited to funds held by the trust company in true fiduciary capacity.
Otherwise it may easily become a mere investment trust. To guard against this
danger seems to have been the purpose of the provisions of the Indiana and Delaware
statutes, quoted in the preceding section, forbidding the acquisition by any persons
other than the trust institution of interests in the fund,2' a requirement reinforced by
the Federal Reserve Board Regulation that documents evidencing the interest be
neither negotiable nor assignable.22 Iii other states reliance seems to have been
placed on a requirement that the funds invested be held by the institution in a
fiduciary capacity. But even where the trust company is thus restricted, a question
arises as to what fiduciary capacities are included. Statutes with respect to these
matters vary in their degree of explicitness.
The New York act provides that a common fund may be established: "wherever
there is a fiduciary relationship," and includes for investment funds held by the trust
company as administrator, executor, guardian of an infant or incompetent, and
trustee under a living or testamentary trust.23 The recently issued Banking Board
regulations supplement these restrictions, providing: "The operation of common
trust funds for other than true fiduciary purposes is hereby prohibited. '24 The
Indiana act2 5 contains provisions similar to those in the New York act. Pennsyl-
vania26 and Delaware without specifying categories of funds held authorize the
investment of funds held in a "fiduciary capacity," with Delaware adding, "other
than merely as agent." The Vermont act contains a rather unusual provision that a
trust company may associate for common investment the funds of "individual trusts
held by it whether created by court order or otherwise." This in addition to funds
held strictly as trustee would seem to include funds held as administrator or guar-
dian. The statutes of Ohio and Minnesota allow the investment of money held "as
trustee" and "in trust capacity" respectively. Rather than run the risk of a narrow
interpretation of such provisions, it would seem advisable to adopt the wider pro-
vision used by New York. The Oregon statute provides that a trust company owning
any part of certain specified investments may apportion any part interest therein "to
its 'trusts."
SELF-DEALING BY THE TRUST COMPANY
Although in the absence of express statutory provision the trust company will be
subject to liability for self-dealing27 with respect to common trust funds, managerial
facility has directed a relaxation in some instances. The New York act specifically
provides that common fund assets shall be segregated, and that the trust company
'Indiana also provides: "Participating interests shall not be transferable except to the bank or trust
company as such fiduciary of another trust or estate." Ind. Acts 1937, c. 33, §2o(6).
'Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, S17(a). "N. Y. BANKING LAw §ioo-c(x)(x6),
"N. Y. Banking Bd. Regulations, art. X(2). 'Ind. Acts 1937, c. 33, S2o(1).
'*PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 7, §819-xo9(A).
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COMMON TRUST FuN LEGISLATION 435
shall own no interest in the fund other than in its fiduciary capacity 8 Exception is
made allowing the trust company to hold common trust moneys temporarily while
awaiting investment or distribution; and to loan money to a liquidating account if
necessary to preserve that account.29 The Delaware statute is in accord, providing: "it
shall not be permitted that any fractional interests shall at any time be owned by
other than such bank or trust company acting in a fiduciary capacity, and such bank
or trust company temporarily for the purpose of making settlement of a fiduciary
estate that has been terminated." The Pennsylvania act provides that, "in order to
make distribution [an interest in the fund] may be sold by such bank and trust com-
pany or such trust company to another estate of which it is fiduciary or may be sold
to its commercial department, which may in turn resell the same to another estate
of which the bank is fiduciary."3 This act is objectionable because, while the oppor-
tunity for obtaining a self-interest in the fund is restricted, there is no limit to the
length of time that interest may be held once it is acquired. Indiana apparently does
not permit even temporary ownership in the funds by the trust company. The
statute provides: "nor shall any ownership of any part of said fund nor any interest
therein be acquired by any person other than the bank or trust company in its
fiduciary capacity.' The Minnesota act contains the following restriction: "... and
it [the trust company] shall be liable for the administration thereof in all respects as
if separately invested." This broad provision would by application of general trust
rules seem to prohibit sell-dealing. The Oregon statute contains no express pro-
hibition and permits one important form of self-dealing in the italicized clause fol-
lowing: ".. . may apportion any part interest therein to any of its trusts or may
repurchase any such apportionment individually or in fiduciary capacity." Neither
Ohio nor Vermont have included express provisions restraining or permitting such
self-dealing. Inasmuch as the Federal Reserve Board regulations provide that the
trust company shall hold none but a fiduciary interest in the common fund, except
when compelled to so hold because of a creditor relationship and then only until the
next valuation date,32 a trust company in either Oregon or Pennsylvania will find
little comfort in the statutory permission to hold an interest if it desires immunity
for its fund from the federal corporation tax.
One of the primary objections to common trust funds has been the fear that the
trust company would use it as a dumping ground for its own shaky and depreciated
securities. The disastrous use of the substitutionary type of participating mortgage
certificates furnished an example of evils which arise from substitution. 3 Con-
sequently if the 1933 Pennsylvania act giving the bank or trust company the right to
substitute another investment for a security in the fund if the substituted security is
"at least of equal value,"34 is construed to permit the substitution of securities already
held by the institution, then the provision is open to criticism. New York has
IN. Y. BANKING LAW §o00-C(4). "Id. (I).
'PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 7, §819-iio9(A).
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adopted a more rigorous approach providing: "A trust company shall not invest any
of its own funds in such a common trust fund nor shall any trust company purchase
for such common fund any securities from itself or any affiliate.""5
A New York prohibition against assessment of additional fees for maintaining a
common trust fund 6 is a further insurance that the institution will not be motivated
by self-interest. The managerial economies anticipated in the establishment of a
common fund afford justification for this restriction. Although no other state makes
a similar provision, that result will be reached by a similar Federal Reserve Board
regulation.3 7
EVIDENCING INTERESTS IN THE FUND
The proportional interests held by the participating trusts, while satisfactorily
recorded by modern bookkeeping methods of the trust company, often are evidenced
by a document issued to each participant. The New York act in these terms: "...
the company may apportion shares or interests to itself showing on its records every
such share,"38 would apparently sanction either procedure. The Pennsylvania act
has a more explicit provision: "The bank or trust company may issue a certificate of
participation for every estate on behalf of which it owns a fractional undivided in-
terest."39 The Oregon act provides that the: "records of the trust company shall at
all times show every such participating interest." On the other hand the Indiana
act requires certificates to be issued, providing: "participating interests shall be
evidenced by certificates duly executed."'40 None of the other states deal with the
subject.
In practice it has been thought advisable to make these participating interests units
of uniform size, but no statute so requires. However, the New York Banking regula-
tions provide that the original unit of participation shall be one hundred dollars or
a multiple thereof.4 '
INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
The New York act provides that the money held in the common fund may be
invested by the trust company in any form of securities in which a savings bank may
invest, subject to several exceptions of which only one, mortgages, is of major impor-
tance.42 No other state has imposed a like restriction. In the absence of special pro-
vision in the statute, the usual rules governing trust investment will apply to com-
mon funds, In Indiana, Delaware, Minnesota, Oregon and Pennsylvania, invest-
ments are to be governed by the statutory list of legals, 43 unless the trust instrument
provides other instructions.
Although it has been contended that $25,boo is too low,4 4 the New York act and
33N. Y. BANKINo LAW §IO0-c(4). mlbid.
'Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F §17(c)(8). 'N. Y. BANKING LAw §xoo-c(i).
'PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 7, §819-iio9(B).
"Ind. Acts 1937, C. 33, §20(4).
"N. Y. Banking Bd. Reg., art. 1(2). 'N. Y. BANXINo LAw §Ioo-c(3).
"mnd. Acts 1937, C. 33, §20(2); PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1937) tit. 7, §8o 9-i"og(A).
"See Capron, The Federal Reserve Board Regulations of Common Trust Funds, inlra, at p. 448.
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the Federal Reserve Board regulations both limit the investment of funds from any
one estate to that figure. There is an ambiguity in the New York act: "In no event
shall the net aggregate amount of any estate, trust, or fund invested in a common
fLd exceed $25,000 or such lesser sums as the Banking Board may fix:,45 Suppose
$25,000 is invested from one estate in each of two common funds established by the
same institution. That this is not permissible is made clear in both the New York
Banking Board regulations 46 and the Federal Reserve Board regulations47 which
specifically limit the investment to $25,ooo or ioP% of the common fund, whichever
is smaller, regardless of how many common trust funds maintained by the trust
company may be used for investment of funds from one participating estate. Min-
nesota, the only other state providing such a limitation, has set the figure at $5,000
unless express authority to invest in commingled funds is given to the trust company
in the instrument creating the trust. The ambiguity discussed above does not appear.
VALUATiON, WiTnHRAwAL, LIQUIDATIoN, AND SETTLEMENT
With respect to provisions under these heads, the New York Banking Board
regulations and the Federal Reserve Board regulations alone are comprehensive.
Since their provisions are discussed elsewhere in this symposium, they will be merely
noted here.
The New York act permits investment or withdrawal only on a date fixed for
valuation of the entire fund, such valuations to be made at least quarterly.48 Del-
aware requires a valuation upon the termination of each fiduciary estate owning a
fractional interest, and so, apparently, does Indiana.4 9 The rule as set forth in the
latter statutes, however burdensome in the administration of the fund, seems declar-
atory of the procedure which would be required in the absence of specific provisions
to the contrary. "Market value" is the criterion for valuation employed in the statutes
of Delaware, Indiana, and Vermont. In New York the method of valuation is pre-
scribed in the Banking Board regulations.50
New York makes provision for a liquidating account in which investments be-
coming non-legal are to be segregated pending sale.5 1 This allows new estates to
invest in the fund after some securities in its portfolio have fallen from the legal list,
and also protects against the absorption of liquid assets through withdrawals from a
partially frozen fund. Comparable requirements in the Federal Reserve Board
regulations 52 afford protection in other states which have no provision dealing with
the matter.
New York provides in detail special procedure for annual accountings and judicial
settlements with respect to the fund as an entirety, notice being given to all interested,
persons.5 3 The absence of statutory provisions for this in other states would seem
'N. Y. BANKING LAw §xoo-c(i). 'N. Y. Banking Bd. Reg., art. I(2).
"'Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, §17(c) (5). 'N. Y. BANKiNG LAw §ioo-c(6)(8).
"Ind. Acts 1937, c. 33, §20(6). 'N. Y. Banking Bd. Reg., art. V.
51N. Y. BANxmK Iv §SIoo-c(7). 'Fed. Res. Bd., Regulation F, §17(c)(6).
'N. Y. BANEUNG LAw §Sxoo-c(io)(i i)(1).
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to necessitate the incorporation of a scheme for settlement in the instrument estab-
lishing the 'fund if separate accountings for individual estates are to be avoided,
although how complete a safeguard any method so prescribed would prove is open
to some question. To insure accuracy of the account presented to the court the New
York act provides that, on or before the return date of the notice, a bank examiner
shall make an investigation of the common fund and present a certified report as to
whether the condition of the common fund is correctly represented in the account. 4
The Federal Reserve Board regulations undoubtedly will be an important influ-
ence in directing the form which subsequent state legislation will assume. Among the
statutes already enacted there are apparently no affirmative requirements which
prevent an institution from complying with the provisions of the Federal Reserve
Board.55 In some instances the state regulations are more restrictive, in which case
the state statute will control; in most cases the state regulations permit a broader
degree of freedom, and the trust company to achieve desired tax immunity from the
federal corporation tax will be compelled to comply with the Federal Reserve Board
regulations through proper provisions in the trust instrument. With respect to still
other questions the Federal Reserve Board is either silent, or merely states a require-
ment without elaboration. Solution of such problems, e.g., co-trustees, eligibility of
revocable trusts, methods of valuation and settlement, is left to individual state
statutes or to proper provisions in the trust instrument.
Adoption of a statute as inclusive as that of New York which sacrifices flexibility
for certainty of control seems unnecessary in states which are not faced with the
difficult problem of regulating many vast institutions. On the other hand, a statute
as general and indefinite as that of Ohio seems inadvisable if the most successful
use of the common trust fund is to be attained. Most desirable would be a statute
which is general where the Federal Reserve Board regulations are specific, which
provides supplementary rules where the Federal Reserve Board has indicated need
for state action, and which vests in a state governing board power to keep the two
in harmony.
"Id. (13).
'A possible source of conflict lies in the provisions of the Delaware and Indiana laws providing for
withdrawals at the termination of each participating trust. See p. 437, supra.
